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DISCOVERY AS AN ABDUCTIVE MECHANISM




Process studies of organizational and strategic change have drawn attention to the dy-
namics that generate such change, but we still know little about how discovery unfolds
within change. A field study of efforts to create a new system for delivering inpatient
medical care revealed that surprises and discoveries, and constructively oriented re-
sponses to them, occurred continuously throughout organizational change, not merely
at the outset. Seeking to understand this empirical puzzle, I drew on the concept of
abduction from pragmatism and organizational studies. This study makes two contri-
butions to theory about the relation between discovery and change. First, I develop a
framework that explicates the central role of discovery as an abductive mechanism that
enables participants to reorient prevailing habits. Analyses reveal discovery to operate
through what I call “abduction sequences,” or loosely connected and overlapping epi-
sodes of creative social activity. Three key motors and their attendant feelings drive
discovery via abduction sequences: surprise, doubt, and inquiry. Second, I provide a
methodology for use in future research on discovery. Specifically, I propose abduction
sequences as a useful analytic means for examining discovery within change and other
inquiry processes, such as innovation and learning, that generate fundamentally new
ways of working.
Organizational scholars have long acknowledged
the daunting challenges of creating change that in-
volves a fundamental reorientation in prevailing
practices and beliefs (Bartunek, 1984; Greenwood
& Hinings, 1996; Huy, Corley, & Kraatz, 2014;
Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Weick & Quinn,
1999). Recognition of these challenges has led to
extensive research to identify and overcome obsta-
cles to change and, in particular, resistance from
frontline employees and occasionally from middle
managers (Huy et al., 2014) in conflict overmeanings
or resources. Resistance is generally viewed in neg-
ative terms as an obstacle to implementing plans for
change (Battilana & Casciaro, 2013; see Huy et al.,
2014, and Sonenshein, 2010, for reviews). Research
has also suggested that deliberateplanning and strong
leadership—for example, change agents and “prime
movers” (Weick & Quinn, 1999: 373)—can overcome
obstacles to change presented by employees. This
work tends to characterize employees as “targets ...
[and] themeans formanagement-chosenends” (Michel,
2014:1082,citingMarch&Simon,1958;seealsoSimon,
1976).
Scholarly attention to identifying and overcoming
obstacles to change makes sense, in that doing so is
seen as enabling change in structures and processes.
However, this orientation has prevented the pursuit
of understanding about how people can—and do—
reorient their habits of practice and belief during
organizational change. Indeed, a process study by
Jarzabkowski, Lê, and Balogun (2019: 852, emphasis
in original) noted that, in most research on radical
change, “the way people’s actions shape the actual
process of reorienting are not examined in detail.”
From a pragmatist perspective, the process of reor-
ienting habits is a creative achievement, in that “some-
thing new enters the world: a new mode of acting,
which can gradually take root” (Joas, 1996: 129). The
founder of pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, de-
fined “habit” as adisposition to act in certainways: “I
do not say that it is the single deeds that constitute
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the habit. It is the single ‘ways’which are conditional
propositions ... that constitute the habit” (Peirce,
Hartshorne, & Weiss, 1934: CP 5.510).1 However,
because habits are dispositional (Joas, 1996; Lorino,
2018), they are potentially susceptible and amenable
to creative efforts to navigate indeterminate situa-
tions, such as those involving fundamental change.
Whereas perpetuating habits requires active main-
tenance, reorienting habits necessarily requires peo-
ple to discover new perspectives on indeterminate
situations and “entirely new ways of doing things”
(Tsoukas & Chia, 2002: 575) to address them. By de-
voting more attention to the process of discovery, we
can enhance our understanding of how people’s ac-
tions can reorient their own and others’ prevailing
habits during organizational change.
This paper explores how managers and clinicians
at“DeltaCare” (apseudonym), amedium-sizedhealth
system, created a new model of inpatient care deliv-
ery that originated in a surprisingly difficult mapping
exercise, and that came to require affected clinicians
to reorient their relational and clinical habits.
Through my encounters with these and other par-
ticipants, and my subsequent analyses of their ef-
forts, I became aware of the centrality of surprise and
discovery during key gatherings. The participants I
interviewed did not explicitly use the term “dis-
covery” in their narrative accounts of the change
process; however, they did use vivid figurative lan-
guage in their descriptions of experiences of dis-
covery, such as “Wewere taken aback,” “It was a big
‘aha,’” and “It hits you in the gut so that you can’t let
go.”Moreover, participants in this initiative seemed
genuinely to care, sometimes deeply, about the new
caremodel they haddeveloped. Itwasmore than just
a new way of delivering care; for many, it became a
better way of healing patients. These accounts, ca-
sual interviews, and iterative analyses prompted me
to refine my original focus—“How did DeltaCare
members collectively create the new model of care
delivery?”—to incorporate discovery. My question
thus became “How did discovery unfold within the
organizational change process?”
A colleague’s suggestion and subsequent analytic
work prompted me to borrow the concept of abduc-
tion from pragmatism and organizational studies in
order to theorize the relationship between change
and discovery—and, specifically, to examine how
habits are reoriented in the course of change. Drawn
from the work of Charles Peirce (Peirce et al.,
1931–1958; Peirce et al., 1992), “abduction” is a
conjectural mode of inquiry through which people
generate new ideas in an effort to make sense of
surprisingobservationsor facts (Locke, 2011; Locke,
Golden-Biddle, & Feldman, 2008; Van Maanen,
Sorensen, & Mitchell, 2007). Whereas deduction
“proves that something must be” and induction
“shows that something actually is operative,” the
logic and narrative of abduction “suggests merely
that something may be” (Peirce et al., 1934: CP
5.171, emphasis in original).
A review of the organizational literature revealed
that, despite increasing scholarly attention toward
the use of abduction in research projects (see Klag &
Langley, 2013; Locke, Feldman, & Golden-Biddle,
2015), few studies had examined abduction outside
the realm of research. One notable exception is
Dunne and Dougherty’s (2016) examination of sci-
entists’ use of abductive reasoning in complex
product innovation. Another is Lorino’s (2018) vol-
ume on pragmatism in organizational studies, which
devotes an entire chapter to abduction. In practice-
based work, I found abduction mentioned in publica-
tions on two prescriptive methodologies of deliberate
change, design thinking, and lean management (see
Bicen & Johnson, 2015; Martin, 2009) that incorpo-
rate elements of discovery in their process, though
not always by name (Brown, 2008; Brown & Katz,
2011; Liedtka, 2018; Mann, 2005). However, none of
this work articulates how discovery and abduction
relate or how discovery unfolds during change
processes.
Returning to data analysis, I found that conceiving
of discovery as an abductive mechanism for reor-
ienting habits helped explain how discovery pro-
cesses unfold within organizational change. Closer
analyses of participants’ accounts disclosed what I
call “abduction sequences”: creative social activity
(Lorino, 2018) that fosters curiosity-driven explora-
tion of indeterminate situations, and fuels partici-
pants’ discovery of novel ways of doing things and
reorienting habits. Three key motors and their atten-
dant feelings drive abduction sequences: surprise,
generative doubt, and expansive inquiry. It is striking
that abduction sequences and constructively oriented
responses to surprise and discovery occur continually
1 Citations to publications by Peirce follow customary
conventions in Peirce scholarship, with identifying letters
indicating the following works: “CP” for Collected Papers
of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce, Hartshorne, Weiss, &
Burks, 1931–1958), “EP” for The Essential Peirce (Peirce,
Houser, & Kloesel, 1992), and “NEM” for New Elements of
Mathematics (Peirce & Eisele, 1976). Thus, this citation
“CP 5.510” refers to Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce, volume 5, paragraph 510.
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throughout organizational change, not only in early
efforts.
These insights contribute to theorizing organiza-
tional change by developing a richer understanding
of efforts to reorienthabitsof belief andaction through
change, and by explicating discovery’s central role as
an abductive mechanism for accomplishing this cre-
ative process of reorienting. They also suggest that
discovery potentially occurs in any change process
and is probably much more prevalent in change than
prior research has recognized.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A process-based view (Langley, 1999, 2007) is
uniquely suited to examining the relationship between
discovery and organizational change: it redirects ana-
lytic attention away from overcoming obstacles and
toward questions of “how and why things emerge,
develop, grow, or terminate over time” (Langley,
Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2013: 1). By as-
suming open-endedness and indeterminacy to be
inevitable and distinguishable features of change,
process studies possess the potential to analyze dis-
covery. To date, however, such studies have not ex-
plicitly integrated discovery or abduction into their
analyses. Glimpses of a discovery process are evi-
dent, however, in their portraits of efforts to generate
fundamental change.
Discovery in Process Studies of Change
Some process studies examine dynamics of emer-
gence, unintentionality, and randomness that cata-
lyze discovery. One early study showed how an
unintendedamplificationof a small change led to the
emergence of continuous radical change (Plowman,
Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky, & Travis, 2007).
Another portrayed how change emerged in an un-
expected area, and surprisingly became the success
story for an organization’s overall change initiative
(Wiedner, Barrett, & Osborn, 2017). In presenting a
view of change processes as “unowned,” a third
study (McKay & Chia, 2013) showed how senior
leaders’ well-intentioned choices for change pro-
duced unintended negative consequences. Such dy-
namicsopenup thepossibilityof examiningdiscovery
processes that are themselves emergent, often unin-
tentional and nonlinear.
Process studies also identify mechanisms of orga-
nizational change that open up fertile new territory
fordiscoverybyhighlightingparticipants’ struggleswith
surprise, tensions, or other situational indeterminacies.
Such mechanisms include paradox (Jay, 2013), micro-
processes of meaning-making (Spee & Jarzabkowski,
2017), creative space (Bucher&Langley, 2016;Howard-
Grenville, Golden-Biddle, Irwin, &Mao, 2011;Wiedner
et al., 2017), and the heterogeneity of interpretive com-
munities (Balogun, Bartunek, & Do, 2015; Howard-
Grenville, Nelson, Earle, Haack, & Young, 2017).
To look more closely at how process studies of
changemight incorporatediscovery, I examineda set
of relevant empirical investigations published in and
since this journal’s special issue on process research
(Langley et al., 2013). I reviewed them in terms of
possible discovery-related elements: an indetermi-
nate situation, a process-based change mechanism,
open responses to unexpected events, and shifts to
new ways of doing things. I reasoned that, although
not explicitly identified as such in these studies, la-
tent elements of discovery are likely to be present.
My reviewdisclosed three areas, discussed below, in
which attention to discovery can contribute to the
literature on organizational change.
Unexpected interruptions of ongoing activity fol-
lowed by reflection allow for discovery. All of the
studies I examined reported unexpected events facing
leaders and organizations, such as declining margins
(Balogun et al., 2015) or a “deep performance crisis”
(Huy et al., 2014). When such studies also described
participants pausing and reflecting on their ongoing
activity, possibilities for discovery became evident.
For example, at Telco, a communications provider
(Jarzabkowski etal., 2019), breakdowns in theplanned
implementation of mandated change prompted man-
agers and employees to stop their activities and reflect
onmisalignments,which led them tomodify the plan.
Although other studies note unexpected events, most
do not mention reflection on interrupted activity. For
example, in McKay and Chia’s (2013) research,
NorthCo senior leaders were observed to continue
to implement failing initiatives and eventually the
company went bankrupt.
Open responses to indeterminacies within change
sustain discovery. How participants respond to unex-
pected situations and ambiguity within change shapes
whether and how discovery processes unfold. Jay
(2013) identified sensemaking amid paradox, which
generates the possibility of discovery as a change
mechanism. There are explicit cues of discovery at
work in Jay’s descriptions of managers’ responses to
indeterminacies generated by paradoxical logics:
“continued to wrestle,” “explicitly reflected on the
question,” “moredirectly confront tensionbetween the
institutional logics at play” (Jay, 2013: 152). However,
the study does not address how such responses
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sustained discovery or generated managers’ novel
synthesis of initially paradoxical logics.
Discovery shapes reorientation of habits. A few
studies haveprovided glimpses of how thediscovery
process enables the reorientation of habits in the
course of generating new ways of doing things. For
example, Spee and Jarzabkowski (2017) presented
two cases of strategic-planning processes at the same
university, both undertaken to address unexpected
funding challenges. They identified three micro-
processes of meaning-making (Spee & Jarzabkowski,
2017) that participants used: “expanding,” by incorpo-
rating proposed meanings along with prevailing ones;
“combining” potentially conflicting prevailing and pro-
posed meanings; and “reframing” prevailing and pro-
posed meanings.
In one case, faculty and administration met to set
new directions for research. When it became clear
that the new term “translational research”would not
accommodate prevailing meanings, administrators
suggested the terms “relevant,” to capture some
proposed meanings, and “rigor,” to signify pre-
vailing meanings about scientific quality. The fac-
ulty’s eventual acceptance of the reframing led to a
new “joint account” of strategic change. In the sec-
ond case, by contrast, participants were unable to
combine proposed and prevailing meanings and
thus not able to accomplish a joint account.
My close review of selected process studies iden-
tified brief accounts of discovery at work within
change. Significantly, however, the discovery pro-
cess remains obscured within change mechanisms;
it has not been explicitly identified as a mechanism
for understanding how reorientation of habits is ac-
complished. Tomake explicit how discovery unfolds
within change, I integrate the concept of abduction
from thework of Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce et al.,
1931–1958).
Discovery and Abduction
The organizational literature has established the
involvement of abduction for discovery, and has
further developed significant theoretical support for
employing abduction in scholarly inquiry (Alvesson
& Karreman, 2007; Behfar & Okhuysen, 2018;
Czarniawska, 1999; Hansen,2008;Ketokivi&Mantere,
2010; Klag & Langley, 2013; Locke, 2011; Locke et al.,
2008; VanMaanen et al., 2007;Weick, 2006). Indeed,
many scholars agree that the concept of abduction is,
in the words of Van Maanen and colleagues (2007:
1149), “perhaps the best answer we currently have
to the problems of discovery.” Deduction derives
specific observations from generalizations, and in-
duction derives generalizations from specific obser-
vations; in Peirce’swords, abduction is the only form
of reasoning that “introduces any new idea” (Peirce
et al., 1934: CP 5.171). As amode of reasoning, Peirce
considered abduction to be weak, yielding “no con-
clusion more definite than a conjecture” (Peirce &
Eisele, 1976: NEM4:319); at the same time, however,
abduction is both the source and a critical engine of
discovery.
Examining the everyday use and operation of ab-
duction is consistent with Peirce’s thinking; he un-
derstood abduction to explain creative thought not
only in scientific endeavors but also in ordinary
human activities. As Santaella (2005: 188), para-
phrasing Peirce, observed, “There is chance in dis-
covery but there is also logic ... a live logicwhich can
explain creation in science, art, and everyday life.”
Yet, to date, only a few studies have systematically
used the concept of abduction to elucidate organi-
zational inquiry processes (see Dunne & Dougherty,
2016; Lorino, 2018).
Discovery, abduction, and reorienting habits in
organizational change. Early in his career, Peirce
considered abduction to be an evidencing process:
an inference from data to a hypothesis. Later, he
“widened his concept of inference to include meth-
odological processes” (Burks, 1946: 301) involved
in the discovery of hypotheses. Defining abduction
more broadly is important because it incorporates
both the inquiry context and social processes—such
as observation, surprise, and puzzling over what is
not known—that support (or not) abduction. It also
situates abduction within the act of meaning-
making. Logic and narrative are inseparable: ab-
duction can be understood as the “simultaneously
narrative and logical creation of newhypotheses, the
search for a plausible story that might transform the
initial puzzling situation into an intelligible and
testable account” (Lorino, 2018: 95). Through nar-
ration of a plausible story, abduction brings coher-
ence and a future orientation to an indeterminate
situation. Thus, abduction is a creative and social in-
ferential process within ongoing processes of inquiry
and acts of meaning-making (Dunne & Dougherty,
2016; Locke et al., 2008; Lorino, 2018).
Peirce’s theory that belief and doubt underlie all
human action is central to explicating the relation
between discovery and reorientation of habits in a
context of change. According to one commentator on
Peirce’swork, through the course of our lives, “allwe
have for interacting with experience are our beliefs
and our doubts” (Chiasson, 2001: 55). “Belief” can be
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characterized as a calm and satisfactory state of
congruence between one’s habits and one’s envi-
ronment. It is that upon which we are willing to act.
When we believe something, we expect certain
outcomes to occur and interpret our observations
according to these expectations. Further, we not
only cognize our belief, we feel our belief; this
“feeling of believing” (Peirce et al., 1992: EP 1:114)
itself indicates an established habit at work. By
contrast, “doubt” is a state of incongruence be-
tween one’s habits and one’s environment. In such
indeterminate situations, our functioning habits
meet with some form of resistance from the world.
Indeed, for Peirce, a “true” doubt is one that “in-
terferes with the smooth working of the belief-
habit” (Peirce et al., 1934: CP 5.510). We become
uneasy, and often troubled or uncomfortable.
Humans constantly encounter unexpected situa-
tions that require reconsideration of habits. These
breakdowns of habit can become a starting point for
their reorientation. Indeed, the ability to “take” and to
“lose”habits is, inPeirce’sview (Peirce,Hartshorne,&
Weiss, 1935: CP 6.613), essential to reorientation:
The highest quality ofmind involves a great readiness
to take habits and a great readiness to lose them. ... No
room being left for the formation of new habits, in-
tellectual life would come to a speedy end.
We still know very little about how discovery
operates to foster the taking and losing of habits
within organizational change and other inquiry
processes. By integrating abduction and a process
view of change, the present study contributes new
understanding of the undertheorized relation be-
tween discovery and the reorientation of habits of
belief and action via organizational change.
METHODOLOGY
Research Setting and Change Initiative
This field study took place at DeltaCare, a hori-
zontally integrated, medium-sized, nonprofit health
system located in the central region of the United
States. At the time of the research, the system con-
sisted of four hospitals, approximately 5,000 staff
members and clinicians, and 125 primary care pro-
viders in 20 locations. About a decade prior to the
creation of the new inpatient care model, DeltaCare
had created a well-regarded organization develop-
ment (OD) functionwhose headworked directlywith
the senior leadership team. Later, immediately prior
to the change initiative, the organization introduced
leanmethodology into its quality improvement efforts.
Consistent with this methodology, senior leadership
began to include patients in sponsored events.
In the course of exploring how the hospital system
could assure its continued relevance 10 to 15 years in
the future, DeltaCare clinicians, managers, and se-
nior leaders created (with input from patients) a new
model of inpatient care delivery. This initiative be-
gan in March 2005 and continued through imple-
mentation of the first unit in February 2007. The new
care delivery model embraced “a vision of hospital
care with nursing at its center provided in an envi-
ronment designed specifically ... to ensure safety and
to promote healing” (Internal document, 2007). It
also reoriented clinician relationships by bringing
together physician, nurse, and pharmacist at a pa-
tient’s bedside shortly after admission to discuss a
care plan.
A comparison of comparable patients in the new
unit and traditional inpatient units at the end of 2008
found that the average length of stay had decreased
by at least 10%. Moreover, defect-free medication
reconciliation had improved from1.05 in 2006 for all
units to zero defects per chart in the new care unit
(Internal document, 2009). Finally, the percentage of
patients satisfied with their care had increased from
68% in traditional units to 90% in the new unit.
Leadership spread the new care model to other
medical–surgical and specialty units, introducing a
second unit in 2009 and a third in 2010. These units
continued to show improvements in quality, patient
satisfaction,andnursingsatisfaction.Costsand lengths
of stay also declined. By 2013, all inpatient units were
onstream (Internal document, 2013).
From the outset, the gatherings and conversations
that eventually culminated in the new care model
intentionally involved multiple stakeholders: not
only nurses, physicians, and senior leaders, but also
pharmacists andunitmanagers. Patients, volunteers,
and some board members also participated in large
events. Furthermore, leaders understood that phy-
sicians’ engagement was critical if the initiative was
to succeed, and, from the beginning, two to three
hospitalist physicians participated as “physician
champions” in every cross-disciplinary event. As
the nursing transformation leader recalled:
We’ve done a lot of work behind the scenes. I meet
routinely with the main physician champion and di-
rector of operations, andwe talk a lot aboutwhat is the
role of physician champions ... to be the catalyst for
change in the hospital.
Over time, the change initiative grew in scope to
incorporate threemajor area: care flowprocesses (the
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subject of this study), introduction of a new elec-
tronicmedical record system that couldbe tailored to
fit the new care model, and renovation of physical
space.After the board of trustees voted in late 2007 to
extend the newmodel to other inpatient units and to
raise funds for a new building, the initiative to ren-
ovate existing units expanded to include new con-
struction for the new units. To support the extension
of the new model, the hospital system president se-
cured the secondment of a nonclinician manager
to assume the role of full-time project manager.
DeltaCare support staff, including an organizational
development specialist and a lean improvement
facilitator, became involved as needed.
Data Collection
I collecteddataover a30-monthperiod in2007–2009,
followed by periodic telephone updates with senior
leaders through 2011, and a sustained collection of
documents through 2013. At DeltaCare, as a known
researcherwhoseprimary rolewas toconduct research
(Lofland & Lofland, 1995), I sought to understand
people’s lived experience of creating organizational
change in the form of a new care delivery model. My
involvement began shortly after the first new-model
unit went live, with multiple phone conversations
with senior leadership and collected documents per-
taining to the initiative. I visited in January 2008,
shortly after the board had approved system-wide ex-
tension of the model and planning for the second unit
had begun. I visited again in 2009, just after the second
unit had gone live; a third unit was in the planning
stage.The timingof thevisits enabledcollectionofdata
that captured both retrospective and prospective van-
tage points on the change initiative. Participants re-
flected on their own and others’ efforts to create the
new model, including future social practices, their
experience in implementing the first unit, and on an-
ticipated adjustments to the model for subsequent
units.
The data consisted of formal and casual face-to-
face interviews, supplementedbyoccasional follow-up
emails or phone calls; internal and external archival
materials; and field notes of observations.During site
visits, I conducted interviews, observed meetings
about the change initiative and unit operation, and
collected internal archivalmaterials. I twice observed
traditional and new units in operation (without en-
tering patient rooms) and attended a portion of a
strategic retreat devoted to spread word of the new
model.On theunits, I engaged in casual conversation
withcliniciansabout thenewmodel.DeltaCare leaders
also organized orientation sessions that provided me
opportunities to interact with staff not directly in-
volved in developing the new care model; these ses-
sions provided broader understanding of the change
initiative.
Interview data. These data consisted of formal
and informal interviews. I conducted 25 in-depth,
semi-structured formal interviews with clinicians,
managers, staff members, and senior leaders in-
volved in creating the new care system, including all
the clinicians and managers who had launched the
new system in the initial unit and most of those who
had done so in the second unit. I conducted an ad-
ditional five semi-structured follow-up interviews
with four members of the leadership team for this
initiative (two with the hospital system president
and one each with the project leader, nursing trans-
formation leader, and director of operations). All
interviews were conducted at the interviewees’
workplaces, usually at their offices or in a small
conference room. Given interviewees’ clinical duties,
interviewswerescheduled for45minutes;ultimately,
they averaged an hour in length, and a few lasted
75–90minutes. Some interviewees later contactedme
by email or telephone to tell me something they had
forgotten to mention.
All formal interviews were taped and profession-
ally transcribed, yielding approximately 900 pages
of double-spaced text. After each interview, I recor-
dedmy observations and describedwhat I had heard
at a slightly more abstract level, but without gener-
alizing beyond the data and local context (Diesing,
1971). For example, I pinpointed events that had
been particularly consequential for participants’ ef-
forts and for the trajectory of the change process.
In addition to formal interviews, I engaged in
“conversational interviews”—that is, unstructured
conversations that arose spontaneously in everyday
work situations (Lofland & Lofland, 1995), such as
over lunch, during training sessions, following for-
mal interviews after I had turned off the tape re-
corder, and on the units. They gave me access to
participants I had not interviewed and to follow-ups
with many I had interviewed. For example, clini-
cians might point out some aspect of the physical
unit, such as the huddle space for clinicians or the
absence of a nursing station, as exemplifying a point
they had made earlier about the new care model. Or
staff and clinicians on the unit, and, on one occasion,
the chief nursing officer, might orient me to partic-
ular workings of the new model and how it differed
from prior practice. I also asked questions prompted
by my initial analyses. For example, when I saw
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clinicians working together, I asked about the reali-
ties and difficulties of the revised clinician roles and
their prior expectations. I jotted notes in a small
notebook while on the unit and in training sessions;
the notes yielded an additional 100 pages of double-
spaced typed data.
Archival data. The archival materials comprised
internal and external communications about the
change initiative and launch of the newcare delivery
system. Internal documents (275 pages) included
newsletters distributed to clinicians andother staff to
provide updates on the change initiative; compila-
tions of nursing satisfaction surveys and compara-
tive care metrics; reports and planning documents
about the change initiative; and slides from senior
leaders’ presentations to the board and to external
stakeholders. External documents collected through
2013 (150 pages) included local and national news
coverage and videos on the launch of the new care
model. I also acquired copies of two videos about the
change initiative produced by DeltaCare to share
with donors and board members.
The archival materials fleshed out my understand-
ing of the fuller situation in which the change effort
unfolded. Internal newsletters and presentation slides
were especially useful for compiling a history of the
events, participants, and activities comprising the
initiative. Analytically, I used archival materials to
interrogate, elaborate, and validate themes disclosed
in the interviews. For example, they provided impor-
tant data about the consistent use of cross-disciplinary
groups and the intentional involvement of patients.
Data Analysis
As is typical of qualitative field research (Diesing,
1971; Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995; Locke, 2001),
analytic work began while I was still collecting data
and continued after I left the field. For example, the
notes compiled after interviews helped me distill
local themes that cut across interviews (Diesing,
1971; Lofland & Lofland, 1995) and archival mate-
rials. Among these themes were “collective activity
in the change effort” and “reshaping clinician inter-
actions in delivering patient care.”While still in the
field (and briefly after leaving it), I sought additional
data, often by telephone, to assess the extent of
empirical support for tentative interpretations
(Locke et al., 2008). After leaving the field, I read
the full set of data, making marginal notes about
participants’ day-to-day experiences of creating
the new model and connecting data with prom-
ising provisional ideas.
Induction is the logic through which researchers
derive generalizations from specific observations;
when used in isolation, it yields patterns but not
novel theorizing (Alvesson & Karreman, 2007; Locke,
2011; Locke et al., 2008; Timmermans & Tavory,
2012). Thus, my analytic approach here paired in-
duction with abduction, to develop new understand-
ingofdiscovery.Forexample, Ipaidparticular attention
in the field to occurrences that struck me as unusual
or as out of keeping with my expectations. During
open and subsequent coding (Locke, 2001; Lofland &
Lofland, 1995), I did not assume a straightforward,
nonproblematic progression from data and ideas to
local and general codes. Instead, I envisioned coding
as an iterative activity consisting of many kinds of
moves, including, for example, consulting the liter-
ature repeatedly and, with increasing depth and fo-
cus, working out promising ideas with relevant data,
such as discovery and abduction sequences.
Two observations in particular richly informed
this study. Early on, during formal and conversa-
tional interviews, I noted that participants’ accounts
of the change initiative went beyond mere cognitive
descriptions of what had happened when and who
was involved. Without prompting, clinicians and
managers alike expressed chagrin that patients had
struggled in the prior care system. Those involved in
the change effort seemed genuinely to care about the
new care model. Many clinicians, especially physi-
cians andpharmacists, shared their discomfort about
working as a care team in patients’ presence. I came to
regard these confidences as expressions of emotional
investment in the changes they faced individually and
as a group. Over time, I noticed connections between
theseexpressionsand theunfoldingdiscoveryprocess.
Second, many participants pinpointed specific
events in the course of creating the new model that
seemedtoqualifyas“magnifiedmoments” (Hochschild,
2003): episodes of heightened importance, such as in-
terludes of intense glee generated by unusual insight, or
moments of deep concern when things went meaning-
fully wrong. These were events that lent new urgency
and meaning to the change initiative: variously, mem-
berswitnessedpatients’difficultieswith thecurrent care
system, struggled themselves to delegate important
clinical tasks, orweredelighted to realize that thenew
model might actually work. Because these events
seemed central to their narrations, I compiled an in-
ventory of them. To protect against retrospective bias,
I added such events to the inventory only when par-
ticipants fromdifferent disciplinesmentioned them
or when archival materials provided details about
them. Curious about these events, I developed a
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data-rich vignette about each of them. In my later ex-
plorationofhowdiscoveryoperateswithinchange, these
vignettes became important resources for articulating
abduction sequences, along with work in pragmatism.
Analytic shifts. As in much qualitative research,
my focus evolved. In addressing my question—how
discovery unfoldedwithin organizational change—I
had framed discovery as a set of subprocesses of the
change process, each associatedwith a primary logic
(abduction,deduction, induction) thoughother logics
are also present. Two challenges to this framing
prompted its reconsideration: the finding that dis-
coveryoccurredcontinuously in thecourseof change,
not merely at the beginning; and comments received
during the review process that the subprocesses
looked like another model of change.
In trying to untangle the processes of change and
discovery, I eliminated the subprocesses and revisited
the data. Concurrently, I returned to the literature on
abduction (especially Lorino, 2018, and Peirce et al.,
1992). Indoingso, Inoticed that thevignettesdeveloped
earlier related to abduction and to Peirce’s theory of
belief and doubt.2 Conjoining my data with that litera-
ture led to elaboration of an abductive cycle in the form
ofanewanalyticunit that Icall“abductionsequences.” I
use this term to signify loosely connected and over-
lapping episodes of situated creative social activity
(Lorino, 2018) that unfold within the change process in
ways that are neither random nor predictable.
Abduction Sequence as Analytic Unit of Discovery
Analytically, abduction sequences consist of three
key motors and their attendant feelings: surprise,
doubt, and inquiry. The enactment of these se-
quences sustains discovery via participants’ con-
structively oriented responses to the motors and to
newly discovered possibilities. Figure 1 illustrates
the relation between prevailing belief (the upper half
of the figure) and doubt (the lower half). Belief and
doubt characterize the coordinated transaction be-
tween humans—the locus of habits—and their en-
vironment. Beliefs become susceptible to doubt via
surprising experiences: doubt triggers inquiry about
new possibilities, new beliefs replace old ones, and
new beliefs may again become susceptible to doubt.
Belief.Belief is“of thenatureofahabit” (Peirceetal.,
1992: EP 1:115); beliefs “guide our desires and shape
our actions” (Peirce et al., 1992: EP1:114). They remain
settled until they are impinged on by unexpected
situations—that is, until something surprisingoccurs,
we continue to believe and to accept our beliefs.
Surprise. Central to abduction, surprise is “any
event that happens unexpectedly or any expected
event that takes an unexpected turn” (Cunha, Clegg,
& Kamoche, 2006: 319). In the event of a surprise, we
are unable to interpret whatwe experience in light of
prevailing belief and often feel at a loss. Yet surprise
also demands understanding, requiring us to guess
about the meaning of whatever has surprised us. In
this respect, surprise provokes doubt.
Doubt. Our beliefs become unsettled and action
becomes paralyzed; we know neither how to act nor
what to believe: “The irritation of doubt causes a
struggle to attain a state of belief” (Peirce et al., 1992:
EP 1:115). In other words, doubt demands under-
standing and provokes inquiry.
Inquiry. Triggered by doubt, inquiry is a social
process: “a cooperative search for truth for the pur-
pose of copingwith real problems encountered in the
course of action” (Joas, 1996: 128). Its object is to
create a new actionable situation. Inquiry and its at-
tendant feelings, suchas anticipation and excitement,
can transform, adapt, reinvent, and reject habits—
beginning with failing habits—and elicit new ones.
Inquiry acts simultaneously on the situation (envi-
ronment) and on habits (the locus of which is people)
to rebuild their relationship.
New belief. When we replace a belief that was in
doubt with a different belief that has withstood the
test of experience (Misak, 2004), we once again feel
settled in our (new) belief. We have created a new
actionable situation. New beliefs in turn become
susceptible to doubt if challenged by surprising ex-
perience, and the abductive cycle is renewed.
CREATING COLLABORATIVE CARE
IN DELTACARE
Empirical analyses of the creation of a new system
of care delivery at DeltaCare, using the abduction
sequence as the analytic unit, showed that discovery
occurred continuously throughout the change pro-
cess, and operated via five abduction sequences.
During the first two sequences—“engage the inde-
terminate situation” and “deepen the significance of
the indeterminate situation”—participants discov-
ered new understanding of the situation and made
new meaning about its significance. In the third
sequence—“construct an imagined configuration”—
participants imagined new possibilities that in turn
2 Curiously, Peirce did not spell out the relations among
doubt, belief, and abduction (Paavola, 2015). Selected
work by contemporary pragmatists (Misak, 2004; Paavola,
2012, 2015) have illuminated that relationship.
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generatedassociatednewhabitsofpracticeandbelief.
In the final two sequences—“try on new habits” and
“negotiate new habits”—participants experimented
with conditional new habits associated with the
imagined configuration. Together, these five sequences
enabled participants to let go of prevailing habits and
tentatively take on new ones that supported funda-
mentally new ways of working.
In the following sections, each of the five se-
quences is first developed narratively and then in
terms of the abduction sequence cycle. Figures 2 to 6,
below, depict the five sequences profiled.
Abduction Sequence #1: Engage the
Indeterminate Situation
Since her promotion and transfer to this part of
DeltaCare a few months earlier, the hospital system
president had been talking extensively with clinical
leaders and managers about possible ways of creat-
ing value in the marketplace that might sustain the
relevance of the hospital system for 10 to 15 years.
Using the leanmethodology recently introduced into
the organization, she followed up these conversa-
tions by sponsoring a four-day enterprise-wide “value-
stream” event conducted by a lean consultant (sensei).
She invited a cross-disciplinary group, including
frontline clinical staff, managers, and senior leaders.
Participants also included boardmembers, volunteers,
and patients; the patient participants had been identi-
fied via physician referral, self-nomination, and
invitations to patients who had submitted formal
complaints about their care.
Mapping high-level care flows. Designed to “fig-
ure out the hospital,” the event addressed the highest
levels of inpatient, outpatient, and emergency care
delivery. The participants analyzed care processes
and patient flows within and across each of the three
areas. The consultant grouped participants by area,
assigning each group to a small room. Using paper
posted on the walls, each group mapped the flows
that characterized its assigned care area and iden-
tified points of connection with the other areas. As
one clinician explained, “We tried to map the flow
of the patient through our services to the best of
our ability, looking for connections as well as
where there were poor handoffs.” Some partici-
pants reported visiting other rooms to gain per-
spective on their group’s connections with flows in
other areas.
Not all went smoothly. Reconvening, all three
groups expressed surprise at their inability to map
the respective care processes clearly, especially at
the highest levels. The project manager later recoun-
ted the difficulties they experienced:
This mapping exercise is at a very high level, at the
60,000-foot view. And you could still see the frag-
mentation ... the poor handoffs. You could see all the
breaking points, where there was no integration be-
tween the patient coming from an ambulatory ward
into the acute care setting, back to the ambulatory
ward.
Participants interviewed recalled discussingwhether














issues in patient handoffs. Worried, the full group
chose to takea closer lookat themappingproblemsby
walking the care flows.
Walking actual care flows.The sensei consultant
reassigned participants to the same three groups.
When possible, they would follow real patients;
otherwise, they would replicate a typical patient’s
path accompanied by frontline staff who would de-
scribe the flow as theywalked it. The inpatient group
began at admission and proceeded through dis-
charge. The outpatient group started at a specialist’s
office on thehospital campus andproceeded to other
buildings where testing was performed. Since map-
ping showed patients having no further contact with
the hospital after leaving the emergency department,
this group merged into the other groups.
Reconvening after walking the care flows, a num-
ber of clinicians and managers described their ex-
periences as “eye opening” and “discomforting.”
Poor handoffs and other disconnects had been evi-
dent. For example, those who had walked inpatient
flows observed how “chaotic” it could be for a hos-
pitalized patient to get services; waiting and delays
were commonplace. For instance, onlywhenaphysical
therapy transport aide arrived at the room of a patient
scheduled for physical therapy did it become apparent
that thepatientwas in the radiologydepartmentwaiting
for an MRI. Participants also observed nurses trying to
work around inefficient systems to get needed but
delayed services for patients. A frontline nurse who
participated in this group sharedwhat she described as
a “common situation.” Lab work was needed to deter-
mine which antibiotic was most appropriate for a pa-
tient; when the lab work was not completed on time, a
nurse had to make repeated calls to the lab. A clinical
leader summarized the inpatient group’s insights: “Af-
ter having problems mapping the flow ... and watching
the difficulties of nurses in progressing patient care, we
realized just how often patient care involved heroics.”
A clinician member of the group who had walked
outpatient flows described care delivery as “really
not a very patient-friendly experience at all.” Pa-
tients sent from a specialist’s office for diagnostic
tests had to walk through two buildings. Then, be-
cause they were typically not prescheduled at the
lab, they frequently experienced delays. On occa-
sion, these delays lasted hours, uprooting plans and
causing longwaits for patients. Then, patients had to
retrace their steps to the physician’s office. Even an
outpatient who had a scheduled lab test typically
returned later for other tests. Some clinicians initially
attributed this scenario to system scheduling issues,
or to physicians issuing orders for tests sequentially.
A nurse relayed that participating patients offered a
different perspective: that the “system made it too
difficult to navigate more than one test, so people
preferred to come back on another day.” Equally
troublingwas seeing elderly andpulmonary patients
struggle to navigatemultiple buildings and corridors
for prescribed tests. “When youwalked this flow as a
patient,” a clinician recalled, “You understood that
elderly people ... were walking way too much for
their abilities to get their testing done.”
By all accounts, participants in the event felt
deeplychagrined athavingobserved somanypatient
struggles and other hindrances to care, including
undue hardships for the most vulnerable patients.
Both disconnects and heroic efforts by clinical staff
to head them off were real and undeniable. As a
clinical nurse leader recalled, “As we discussed our
mapping and walking all of those flows, what was
clear to all of us, to all of us, in that room is that the
flows didn’t connect at all.” Others concurred:
Well, I think it helped us, to say, “Wait a minute, this
really is chaotic.” (Senior leader)
It was a big “aha” that helped make visible to us that
wewere not doing ... patient care as well as wewould
like. (Physician)
Further discussion of the now visibly problematic
nature of care delivery led participants to embrace a
focus on the patient and on eliminating hardships in
the delivery system. They resolved to begin imme-
diately, with inpatient care, and subsequently to
proceed to other care areas. The project manager
commented: “We quickly realized that we couldn’t
work on all disconnects in care at once.”The clinical
nurse leader concurred: “When we looked at inpa-
tient care ... itwas so broken thatwe agreed: that’s the
first thing we need to fix.”
Participants in this initial enterprise-wide event
continued to discuss its impact on them, and its role
in catalyzing their efforts to change care delivery:
It’s an intense week ... You’re all together, you’re
working hard, you’re released from your other duties
... It’s that mixing it up, and walking it, and seeing it,
that helped spawn some of the consequential crea-
tivity. (Nurse manager)
It has been very rewarding being involved from the
very beginning ... whenwe decided collectively to try
to shoot for a big breakthrough improvement. (Hos-
pital administrator)
The breakthrough for the eventual Collaborative Care
model clearly came inmapping andwalking the flows
and talking about them with each other. (Physician)
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Findings explicated as abduction sequence.
Figure 2 depicts the abduction sequence that par-
ticipants experienced when mapping and then walk-
ing care flows.
As shown, a challenge to prevailing Belief, andmove
to Surprise, occurredwhenparticipants experienced
unexpected difficulties in a mapping exercise that
they had expected to be straightforward. In sus-
pending activity to reflect on what their difficulties
mightmean, rather than presuming that they already
knew, the group advanced toward Doubt. Asking
themselves whether the difficulties pointed to real
issues in patient care prompted a further progres-
sion, from Doubt to Inquiry. In search of better un-
derstanding of the situation, participants chose to
walk the care flows—when possible, with real pa-
tients. By neither dismissing nor presuming to un-
derstand the surprising mapping difficulties, the
group kept alive the possibility of discovering what
they did not yet know. What they discovered was
that care fragmentation and patient hardship were
real and undeniable. Participants progressed from
Inquiry to new Belief as they shed the prior Belief
that mapping care flows should be unproblematic,
and embraced a new Belief that disconnects in flows
are systemic obstacles to patient-focused care that
must be eliminated. This shift in perspective helped
them navigate the indeterminate situation.
Abduction Sequence #2: Deepen the Significance of
the Indeterminate Situation
After the enterprise-wide value stream event, the
chief nursing officer scheduled a series of events to
map specific flows of inpatient care. At the recom-
mendationof theprojectmanager, she adopteda lean
tool: vertical value stream (VVS), which structures
efforts to capture a flow in detail. A staff facilitator
explained that “an enterprise value stream is a mile-
wide and inch-deep” analysis of a hospital system;
by contrast, “a [VVS] is a mile-deep and inch-wide”
analysis of a single flow, such as inpatient care.
The chief nursing officer invited the hospital sys-
tem president, the project manager, clinicians, and
patients to participate in the event. She later de-
scribed loading a fresh VVS slide onto a laptop and
projecting it for all to see. For thosewhohadnot been
present at the earlier enterprise-wide value stream
FIGURE 2











New belief: Mapping care flows is difficult 
due to  disconnects that also cause hardships 
for patients. Obstacles need to be minimized.
Original belief:
Mapping care flows is a straightforward exercise.
Mapping flows is more
difficult than
 anticipated.
What does this mean?
Walking actual care flows
DISCOVERY: Flow is
fragmented. We are deeply
disturbed by patients’ 
struggles
to access care.
Could obstacles to mapping flows signify real difficulties in care?
Could they be an artifact of the exercise?
Something else?
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event, she recounted the discoveries of care frag-
mentation and patient struggles that had culminated
in the present effort to identify obstacles to optimal
inpatient care delivery. Then, the group began to fill
in the services associated with inpatient flow, pro-
ceeding from the top to the bottom of the slide. The
project manager described what happened next:
We were doing a [VVS]. You knew things were bro-
ken. Then something happened that hits you in the
gut so that you can’t let go. It moves and compels you
to do something different. It occurred when the hos-
pital system president commented that, while she
knew how patients got into the hospital, she didn’t
know how they got out.
This remark provoked many questions, notably:
What makes it so difficult to know how patients
move through the system to discharge?
The chief nursing officer shared that, after much
discussion, the group eventually turned back to the
slide, this time focused not on obstacles but on how
patients moved through the inpatient care system to
discharge. They worked backward to admission and
forward toward discharge. Even so, they reported
ongoing struggles. In spite of persistent effort, they
could not visually map how patients moved through
the system.
Oneparticipantdescribed “turning ourheads from
side to side trying to see how patientsmight progress
in care to discharge.” The chief nursing officer
recalled that, frustrated by her own inability to vi-
sualize the flow and aware of people cocking their
heads to view the slide from a different angle, she
turned her laptop on its side and thus repositioned
the VVS slide horizontally. She described what
followed:
We were taken aback. We realized, and then acutely
realized at a different and deeper level, that the old
care process was oriented to justifying patient stay in
the hospital. We needed a different process that fo-
cused on optimal recovery.3
They had seen for the first time that the care flow
itself was not set up to move patients seamlessly
through the system. This discovery prompted the
realization that they could not fix the current system
solely by removing obstacles: they had to redesign
the entire process of inpatient care delivery. A nurse
manager participant explained the insight:
Care is not driven by what the therapy can deliver, or
when the physician can come ... It’s driven by what
the patient needs. That’s a whole different paradigm
shift.
Findings explicated as abduction sequence.
Figure 3 depicts the abduction sequence as partic-
ipants experienced it whenmapping inpatient care
flows.
Although participants in the VVS event expected
care to be fragmented, they thought they would be
able to identify systemic obstacles in the way of in-
patient care. The challenge to prevailing Belief oc-
curred when they struggled to map these obstacles.
The remark “We know how patients get in ... but not
how they get out” had provoked surprise. In halting
their activity to reflect, the group advanced to Doubt.
How could they not know how patients got out of
their system? Seeking to understand this, the par-
ticipants ignited Inquiry. They looked again at the
flow, this time with a focus on how patients actually
moved through the system towarddischarge.As they
cocked their heads to view the flow from different
angles, and the chief nursing officer turned the VVS
slide sideways, the group discovered that merely
removingobstacleswouldnot suffice: theyneeded to
redesign the care delivery process around patient
needs. In abandoning the prevailing Belief that
eliminating obstacles would address care fragmen-
tation, the group moved toward a new Belief that a
“wholedifferent paradigm”wasneeded for care to be
“truly patient centered.” This shift deepened the
significance of the situation, reorienting their efforts
away from improving care delivery toward design-
ing a fundamentally new way of delivering care.
Abduction Sequence #3: Construct an
Imagined Configuration
Nursing leadership devoted several subsequent
VVS events to key aspects of care delivery, one of
which was the admissions process. Clinicians from
various disciplines, the projectmanager, and current
and former patients participated. When queried
about the involvement of patients in these events,
one nurse responded:
3 The phrases “We don’t know how they [patients] get
out” and “The old care process was oriented to justifying
patient stay” may seem shocking. I heard them explained
through the invocation of a tree as a metaphor, as follows.
The admission process—getting into the hospital—
resembles a tree’s trunk. Various physicians’ orders then
radiate out to subunits of the system, which resemble
branches and twigs. These subunits, such as radiology and
physical therapy and labs, perform their work on separate
paths. No single role coordinates them to create alignment
around patient needs.
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We have to have patients on our team ... Every time
I’ve been in events, there were patients ... We always
start out with ... rules of our engagement and one of
those rules is “When the patient speaks, you will be
quiet.” ... I can honestly say we didn’t bring patients
that were always the happiest to our table.4
The projectmanager who attended the admissions
event recounted that the name of the new care pro-
cess “actually came from our patients’ comments.”
As clinicians described it, they were looking at the
admission process. A physician recalled a patient
describing having experienced “different clinicians
ask at least five or six times”why she was there. She
became so frustrated recounting this experience that
she asked the clinicians present, “Why aren’t you
talking to each other?” Expressing a similar frustra-
tion, another patient described “howaggravating it is
to have different people ask you the same question as
you lie helplessly in a strange bed” (Internal docu-
ment: board presentation). A nurse supervisor re-
layed another patient’s comment: “Hold on. ... You
all don’t look like you knowwhat you’re doing. If you
don’t tell me that you know what you’re doing, I
won’t think you do.”
Clinicians listening to patients’ accounts of their
difficult experiences “realized that weweren’t really
acting together on such critical care” (Chief nursing
officer). While trying to characterize a system in
which clinicians would work together for the pa-
tient, those at the meeting remember someone
suggesting the term “collaborative care,” which im-
mediately resonated with many. According to the
projectmanager, thenewname “really brought home
the collaborative care piece to us very quickly,” The
hospital system president agreed: “That’s when
Collaborative Care was born, so to speak.”
After this event, the nursing team arrayed patient
input by the critical questions raised and circulated
the compilation along with information about Col-
laborative Care in the first system-wide newsletter
about the change efforts:
FIGURE 3











New belief: We need a 
“whole new paradigm” to become 
“truly patient centered” in care delivery.
Original belief: Care is fragmented. Mapping system






Reorienting a slide to 
depict the care flow
horizontally
DISCOVERY: The system 
itself is the problem; it 
hinders patients’ progression.
Why can’t we map system obstacles?
How can we not know how patients get out of our system?
4 Another nurse commented that the norm of inviting
patients to events “was sometimes hard for our doctors.”
She described a doctor participating in an event who was
“less than gracious to our patient when the patient asked a
question. ‘Well,’ the doctor said, ‘How do you exactly
know? If it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, it’s probably
a duck.’ Quite honestly, it was very inappropriate behav-
ior. ...Wehad a lot of repairwork to dowith that patient. So
we have to get doctors wanting to listen, not just pretend to
listen. ... Self-importance sometimes gets in the way.”
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Collaborative Care is a new initiative for DeltaCare
hospitals to build a new way to deliver care. ... This
will be ... key ... to becoming the preferred destination
for inpatient care.
We’ve included patients in our events and we’ve
heard lots from them about how we can do better. ...
They want to know: “Who are you?” “What’s wrong
with me?” “What are [we] going to do about it, and
why?” “Who is going to do it andwhen?” “When am I
getting out of here?” “What do I need to know to
continue to care for myself when I leave?”
It is an appropriate expectation. Some of youmay feel like
you alreadydo these things. ... And someof youmay, but it
doesn’t happen consistently, by everyone, every day. (Inter-
nal document:Newsletter, 1(1), 2005, emphasis in original)
Findings explicated as abduction sequence.Figure 4
depicts the abduction sequence experienced by partici-
pants, including patients, who reviewed data on patient
care needed for the admissions process.
Considerable negative patient feedback challenged the
Belief that clinicians already collected patient care data
effectivelyduringadmissions.Surprisedbythefeedback,
the clinicians stopped to take in patients’ pointed ques-
tions about how clinicians interacted in care delivery:
“Whyaren’t you talking to eachother?”Reflectionon the
fragmentation of care that the patient’s questions had
drawn attention to prompted the group’s move toward
Doubt. Had they, as clinicians, been responsible for
sowing confusion? Rather than dismissing the negative
feedback, the group moved toward Inquiry, as they
imaginedhowcaremight bedeliveredbetter if clinicians
acted in concert. The new name, Collaborative Care,
embodied an imagined new configuration (Dunne &
Dougherty, 2016). In the course of generating the possi-
bility of a fundamentally new model of care delivery,
members moved toward a new Belief.
Abduction Sequence #4: Try on New Habits
Toguidedevelopment of thenewmodel, nowknown
as Collaborative Care, nurses drew on patient feedback
that clinicians weren’t “on the same page,” and on the
provisionalnewBelief that, tobe“trulypatient focused,”
clinicians would have to work as a team to deliver care.
Eventually, nurses persuaded physicians and pharma-
cists to agree in principle to meet “side by side with the
patient and their family at the bedside in real time” (In-
terviews and an internal newsletter about the change
initiative). This hypothetical team became known as
FIGURE 4











New belief: Patient-centered care calls 
for members of clinical teams to relate to 
each other and to the patient at the bedside.
Original belief: 
Clinicians collect patient-care data effectively. 
Optimal care is delivered by clinicians 
acting independently.
Patient input faults
clinicians for not 
working together.
Why aren’t you talking 
to each other?
Listening to patients’ 
accounts of their 
experiences. 
Imaging how things
might be done differently
DISCOVERY: Clinicians
 need to work together . 
Collaborative Care embodies 
this vision.
Could we clinicians be responsible for generating 
confusion in care? Are we failing to
 work together on critical care?
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“Trio,” signifying its composition of three clinical pro-
fessions: the physician, as medical expert and team
leader; thenurse,ascaremanager;andthepharmacist, as
clinical expert (Internal documents: presentations to the
board, 2006, 2009; presentation to the foundation, 2009).
As Trio, clinicians were expected to conduct the
admitting assessment of the patient jointly, and to
create and update a single care plan. On subse-
quent visits to the patient, in place of the typical
rounding practice, the clinicians— at a minimum,
the nurse and the physician, with the pharmacist
present as needed—entered the patient’s room to-
gether (Interviews; newsletters on the change initia-
tive, 2005–2006; presentation to the board, 2009). A
nurse explained the difference betweenTrio and the
prevailing rounding practice as follows:
The structure [of the team] is not unusual to the rest of
the world. But what is unusual is what they do to-
gether. The nurse isn’t just standing by the door lis-
tening to the doctor, taking notes and orders. She’s
participating in the physical exam and actively in
dialogue about the orders and care plan.
One manager described the nursing team’s dedica-
tion to making Trio a reality:
We could have easily said, “Oh, we’ll never get the
physicians there.” ... But we said, “No, we’re going to
be in the room together. We’re all going to hear the
patient’s story together. ... We’re all going to put [in
place] the plan of care together.” ... No matter how
hard, we were going to make it happen, because we
thought this Trio was the anchor to the whole system.
Early documents (Presentation to the foundation,
2009) and interviews with clinicians distinguished
between current and proposed clinician roles and
expectations as delineated in Table 1:
During the admitting assessment, all clinicians were
to be at the patient’s bedside; the nurse and phar-
macist were to bemore active, and the physicianwas
to listen to the other clinicians. In describing the
implications of Trio for clinicians, the OD staff spe-
cialist emphasized interdependence:
Our providers were used to going in ... see the patient,
come out, write orders, and the nurse tries to catch up;
the pharmacist tries to catch up. But, with Collaborative
Care, they’re all together ... It requires each of them to
commit to being there when they say they’re going to be
there ... for the team to assemble in order to have the
bedside care conference. And that causes them to prac-
tice differently. So ... I don’t want to say sacrifice, but it’s
changing how they practice and how they thought of
themselves within that profession.
Leadership recognized the significance of the
pending changes for clinicians. For example, the
pharmacy director described the change as a “com-
plete role reversal” that would call for a pharmacist to
become an “active clinician at the bedside” and
would “examine the value ofwhat pharmacists bring
to the team” that other clinicians could not. The
hospital system president observed that the new
model would ask clinicians “to change their sense of
what their profession is and their sense of who
they are.”
Hesitancy and discomfort. The nursing unit
leader later described “definitely, hesitancy early
on” with Trio among physicians and pharmacists,
and pervasive hesitancy among all clinicians. Trio
meant letting go of tasks that other clinicians would
now perform. Nurses admitted that letting go of
bedside tasks, such as administering medications,
was “probably one of the biggest struggles.” One
pharmacist expressed his discomfort this way:
“You want to make sure you’re doing the right
thing for the patient, and the ball is not getting
dropped somewhere.” Physicians too lamented a
loss of control: “Where we struggle is the loss of
control, some loss of autonomy, to a degree.”
All clinicians acknowledged that involving pa-
tients in a “real-time” bedside conference was “def-
initely a role changer.” How would they ask each
other questions in front of the patient? How would
they address patients’ questions as a team? In inter-
views, physicians in particular described feeling
vulnerable in front of the patient anduncertain about
what to expect from the other clinicians:
The other big change for us is having input from other
clinicians. ... I want to say challenged.
When you’re a team member, it’s an adjustment to
work as a team. ... I think that’s probably my biggest
adjustment. ... Typically, we’re pretty autonomous,
andwedon’t like to be toldwhat to do.Andnow, all of
a sudden,well, it’s “You can’t do it thatway;we really
need you to do it this way.”
Before, physicianswere sort of independent.Now,we
have the nurse, the pharmacist, with us. ... I mean,
we’re all trained as physicians that we’re going to
work alone. And other people are there to kind of
support you, but never as a co-teammate kindof thing.
And this is definitely more of being that “co-” sort of
thing.
In anticipation of clinicians’ discomfort with imple-
mentingTrio,nursing leaders, theprojectmanager, and
the OD specialist had designed opportunities to try
out the new behaviors with volunteer patients
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before the model went live. As the OD specialist
explained:
It’s not about just learning clinical processes ... It’s
thinking differently about who they are as profes-
sionals within the context of that team delivering ...
care. That doesn’t happen just at the turn of a screw...
Everything in the currentworldwill pull themback to
the way they were functioning before ... to do some-
thing differently really takes sustaining.
Amock-up unit that duplicated the proposed new
space configurationwas constructed in vacant space
for six weeks of training and practice sessions for
nursing staff, including the equivalent of two weeks
of cross-clinical training with physicians and phar-
macists. The clinical nurse leader explained that the
multi-week timeframe was critical in order that
nurses could “constantly experiment” and “unlearn
old behaviors and learn new expectations.” Nurses
selected to staff the initial unit were released from
their usual clinical responsibilities for much of the
training period to familiarize themselves with the
new clinical processes, physical layout, and tech-
nology, and to make final adjustments. During joint
sessions, full clinical teams practiced delivering
care, as Trio, to volunteer patients.
In spite of hesitancy and discomfort, clinicians
and especially physicians valued the practice ses-
sions for clarifying how the new model and Trio
wouldoperate.Onephysician commented: “Each [of
us] needs to see it, feel it, touch it, give input on it,
come to consensus.” Another physician, an early
advocate of the proposedmodel, explained the value
of the practice sessions: “So we came up with a the-
oretical process of how it was going to work. ...
Trialing was incredibly important to say, ‘OK, how
does the flow actually work?’”
The mildly favorable physician response sur-
prised the manager of physician engagement, who
admitted that she had expected some physicians
“to go tilt.” Instead, they were “pretty positive,”
offering comments like, “Hey, this isn’t so bad” and
“I didn’t see how thiswouldwork, but I can see how
this can work now.” She described observing phy-
sicians practicing Trio with other clinicians and
volunteer patients and noting that the physicians,
by listening and asking questions, were acting like
“the pharmacist and nurse had something to add
and contribute.” She remembered thinking that
“they might well become a team.”
Findings explicated as abduction sequence.
Figure 5 depicts the abduction sequence experi-
enced by the clinical team, support staff, and vol-
unteer patientswhile practicingnewhabits associated
with Trio.
DeltaCare managers and clinicians embraced the
imagined new model, which had originated in the
new Belief that optimal patient care requires clini-
cians towork together at the patient’s bedside. At the
same time, however, this model challenged the pre-
vailing Belief that clinicians work independently.
Figure 5 represents this as a juxtaposition of the new
Belief associated with Collaborative Care and the
prevailing Belief. By challenging the prevailing Be-
lief, negative patient feedback about ingrained prac-
tices and the nursing team’s persistent push for
agreement in principle on Trio brought about the
move from Belief to Surprise. The subsequent pro-
gression to Doubt was embodied in clinicians’ re-
sponses throughout implementation of Trio: from
TABLE 1
Current and Proposed Clinician Roles and Expectations
Move away from. . . Move toward. . .
New role expectations (habits of belief
and action)
Nurse Doing bedside tasks “Expanded and empowered role in
decision-making and patient-care
progression, responsible for bedside
management of quality measures”
Work to full scope of practice and trust
other nurses to do so as well
“Too much time spent running for
supplies and equipment”
Listen to patient as Trio in developing
care plan
Pharmacist “Back-end role” “Bedside presence” Step out of backstage role; interact
directly with clinicians and patients
“Teacher to patient and clinical team” Listen to patient as Trio in developing
care plan
Physician Hierarchical orientation “Partner in the care team who exposes
her/his thinking to the professional
team”
Listen to and consider the input of other
clinicians, even in patients’ presence
Listen to patient as Trio in developing
care plan
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“hesitancy early on” to felt discomfort and myriad
questions, especially from physicians, such as “What
if I let go of this work and someone else drops the
ball?” and “How will we ask each other questions in
front of patients?” The six-week offsite training ses-
sion in turn activated themove fromDoubt to Inquiry:
clinicians experienced how the care process and Trio
would actually operate. Not only were physicians
more positive than observers had anticipated, they
discovered that the new model “can work.” As clini-
cians enacted Trio effectively as a team with care
driven by patients’ needs, they generated new Belief.
Abduction Sequence #5: Negotiate New Habits
By all accounts, trying on new habits during the
offsite sessions went better than expected. Even so,
going live with the first new unit unexpectedly
entailed “bumps and bruises.”
During the first couple of weeks, when the unit
“was under the microscope of the whole organiza-
tion, and everyonewas trying to do the newprocess
exactly,” implementation progressed smoothly.
However, a number of managers recalledWeeks 3
through 6 as when “things started to get really
rough.” Once it became apparent that the new
model would require ongoing attentiveness in
implementation, the hospital system president
approved 90 additional days of support for the
new model in use. As a result, the project man-
ager, OD specialist, and care improvement staff
continued to address emergent issues. They de-
scribed their work as “purposeful watching” of
actual use of the new care model. They observed,
for example, that:
Doctors would start the bedside conference in the
patient room without the nurse and pharmacist. ...
Early on, you had a lot of that—doctors falling into
their old patterns. So we just keep working the care
process deeper and deeper and deeper into the new
patterns. (Notes, conversation with project manager
and care facilitator)
Anursemanager on thenewunit explained that, in
working with real patients, clinicians “discovered
the areaswherewe shouldhave spentmore time, and
FIGURE 5
Try on New Habits
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as a team at the patient bedside.
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Clinicians experience hesitancy and discomfort early on.
How will we ask each other questions in front of patients?
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then got in the mode of fixing what wasn’t going
well.”
Tollgates. “Tollgates”—junctures designated for
assessment—proved to be an especially difficult
area. They originated at an event dedicated to as-
sembling the care flows of the new model. A nurse
manager later described how a group of nurses had
arrayed on a board a listing of “everything in care
required for a patient” and then assessed “how each
piece connected with every other piece of the pa-
tient’s stay, such as labs processing test results.” In
the course of doing so, however, they experienced
care flow as “still kind of disjointed” and “scattered”
(Nurse, nurse supervisor). This observation promp-
ted discussion of how to assure that “what should
happen for a patient did happen.”
In discussing their observation with DeltaCare’s
consultant on lean methodology, they learned about
Tollgate, a lean tool for project planning deployed in
manufacturing but not yet in health care. He de-
scribed the tool as useful in identifying appropriate
junctures for “purposeful pauses in a process,” to
assure that all was progressing as planned; he sug-
gested that they “should think about that concept for
patient care.” To determine whether the tool would
work in their situation, the nurses again listed all the
tasks that needed to be done for a patient. This time
they were intentional about mapping the sequence:
“to be very strategic about what you have to do first
versus the kind of thing you do second.”When they
arrayed these tasks alongside every other aspect of a
patient’s stay, they realized, “Oh, that [those links]
could be our tollgates” (Clinical nurse leader).
Visually, they depicted the new care process as a
series of horizontal phases punctuated by periodic
tollgates to assess a patient’s progress in light of the
care plan. As the nursing manager explained:
These [junctures] are our tollgates. ... We say, “This is
what needs to happen for this patient, in this amount
of time, before we can say that’s complete and we can
move on. If it’s not done, we’re pulling the trigger.”
Missed tollgates authorized nurses to interrupt care
progression and work with appropriate clinicians or
ancillary services to solve the problem. As the hos-
pital system president put it, “Nurses are the keepers
of the tollgates.” As long as care was proceeding
according to plan, the nurse advanced the patient
forward.
Difficulties in practice. When initially proposed
as an element of the new model, tollgates provoked
disagreement among physicians and between phy-
sicians and nurses. Physicians saw tollgates as
constraining their independence and authority (Phy-
sician lead, manager of physician engagement), but
they remained a feature of Collaborative Care.
When the new unit opened, nurses described
tollgates as entailing a “must-do checklist,” which
they monitored “to the nth degree, because we were
beginning a pilot.” Shortly thereafter, physicians
began to voice concerns with what seemed to them
“rigid” tollgates. The manager of physician engage-
ment said that some physicians “acted more on tilt”
about tollgates, including one who bluntly declared,
“I really don’t like this.”Other physicians objected to
having todropwhat theyweredoingwithpatients on
other units to return to the Collaborative Care unit. A
typical question was, “Whywould I come up and do
a tollgatewhen Iwas just here twohours ago?”Asone
nursingmanager admitted, “Basically, it [tollgate] just
was not working.”
The project manager convened three events to
address the difficulties, all attended by physicians,
nurses, and pharmacists. The first two meetings
yielded little progress. As the manager of physician
engagement explained, the “first two whacks at it ...
was just like an impasse.” The physicians shared a
few ideas, she said, but the “originators of the unit,
the real strong nursing champions, became exas-
perated that the physicians didn’t get it. And then the
physicians got frustrated that others didn’t get
them.” At the third event, according to both nurses’
andphysicians’ accounts, a“breakthrough”occurred.
The OD and care facilitators presented data showing
that, when physicians participated in tollgates, “even
if it was begrudgingly,” post-discharge statistics were
more favorable.
Having seen that the tollgate process did improve
patient outcomes, clinicians agreed to changes that
made tollgates “less arbitrary” for physicians while
enabling nursing to “own more of the process,”
calling in physicians only when “absolutely neces-
sary.” For this this arrangement to work, physicians
would need to specify milestones that a patient
should have reached at particular points in the care
plan.Nursingwouldmonitor those points and assess
whether to call in the physician. Physicians were
also expected to return to the unit at designated in-
tervals. Theprojectmanager commented: “Basically,
it wasmore clear to both physicians and nurseswhat
the expectations were.”As themanager of physician
engagement remarked, “It was almost a compromise,
but it was a realistic compromise that people
could do.”
Findings explicated as abduction sequence.
Figure 6 depicts the abduction sequence enacted
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by the multidisciplinary clinical group disputing
the inclusion of tollgates in the new model.
Though clinicians affiliated embraced Collaborative
Care and the newBelief that optimal patient-centered
caredelivery requiredclinicians toworkasa team, the
adoption of tollgates represented a particularly un-
welcome challenge to the residual Belief in clini-
cians’, especially physicians’, independence and
authority. Surprise took the form of physicians’ di-
rect challenge to tollgates. In turn, recognition by
managers and clinicians that the process was not
working prompted Doubt. The team was at an im-
passe. The project manager instigated the move to
Inquiry when she convened three events to hash out
differences about tollgates. Not until the third event,
when new data were presented showing better post-
discharge statistics when tollgates were in place, did
a “breakthrough”moment occur. Although tollgates
did work, all clinicians concurred that the process
needed refinement. This discovery led to a new
agreement that adjusted tollgate practices and clari-
fied expectations consistent with the new Belief of
team interdependence.
Two years after the introduction of Collaborative
Care, it appeared that the new expectations for
clinician roles were taking hold. Clinicians’ reflec-
tions on the model attested to its transformative
impact:
Collaborative Care not only helps in patient care; it
helps in staff care. It works. It really works. (Physician)
It took 17–18 years for me to become the nurse I’ve
always wanted to be. ... Very strongly do I feel Col-
laborative Care is the right thing for our patients and
for me professionally. (Registered nurse)
I really like this opportunity to interact with other
medical professionals andhavemore interactionwith
the patients ... on the front end. ... It’s a much more
positive relationship. (Pharmacist)
DISCUSSION
Despite a growing array of process studies on the
dynamics of strategic and organizational change, we
still know very little about how discovery within
change enables the reorientation of prevailinghabits.
Glimpses of discovery are evident in these studies,
and in prescriptive methodologies of change. For
example, when pursued collectively, discovery-
related processes such as reflection (Jarzabkowski
FIGURE 6
Negotiate New Habits
Three events are held at
which clinicians try to
resolve conflict.
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et al., 2019; Jay, 2013) enable participants to reflect
on a puzzling situation fromadifferent vantage point
and to create new understanding. Prescriptive meth-
odologies’ recognition of the value of adopting a fresh
stance for purposes of reflection is exemplified in
practices like gemba (Mann, 2005), “gallery walk”
(Liedtka, 2018), and designer-led ethnographic ob-
servation of end users (Brown, 2008; Brown & Katz,
2011; Martin, 2009). But our understanding of dis-
covery, and how it operates to foster reorientation of
habits, remains partial.
This study’s findings make two important contri-
butions to our understanding of the undertheorized
relation between discovery and change. First, it of-
fers a framework that explains how the unfolding of
discoverywithin and through organizational change
can reorient prevailing habits of belief and action.
The process of discovery, which entails moving
away fromprevailing habits andmoving toward new
ones, operates via five abduction sequences. Indi-
viduals in turn can sustain the discovery process via
constructively oriented responses to surprise and to
resulting discoveries. Second, this study offers a
methodology for use in future research to investigate
the discovery process and in practice, to cultivate
discovery processes. Specifically, I propose abduc-
tion sequences as useful analytic means and vocab-
ulary for purposes of examining discovery within
change and other inquiry processes such as innova-
tion and learning.
How Discovery Reorients Habits within
Organizational Change
Realms of discovery. That discovery occurs con-
tinuously throughout change is a central finding of
this study. Thus, we expect to observe discovery not
merely at the beginning of change efforts but
throughout and after implementation.
The first realm, moving away from prevailing
habits, involves shared efforts to fully experience
and understand indeterminate situations in light of
new experience and future possibilities. This realm,
which primarily involves Abduction Sequences #1
and #2, entails discovering (when ongoing action
is interrupted) the “diffusely problematic quality”
(Joas, 1996: 131) of the situation. It takes iterative
work for participants to realize what they do not
know, or have not yet seen, about an indeterminate
situation. They need to revisit (Timmermans &
Tavory, 2012) the now-indeterminate situation that
helped them let go of prior expectations. The frame-
workposits that discovering an indeterminate situation
and finding new meaning in it depends on partici-
pants’ inability to frame their new experience by
calling on prevailing habits of belief and action.
The second realm, moving toward new habits,
consists of efforts to generate new meaning and
fundamentally new ways of working to address the
indeterminate situation, as they have come to know
it. In this realm,whichprimarily involvesAbduction
Sequences #3 through #5, potential new situations
become more real. To bring this about, participants
imagine new configurations while trying on and
negotiating new ways of working that challenge
prevailing habits. The framework posits that dis-
covering new ways of working depends on partici-
pants’ ability to reframe new experience and to
reorient habits in novel ways.
Abduction sequences and their relations. The
study found that discovery comprises at least five
interdependent abduction sequences, each of which
consists of belief, surprise, doubt, and inquiry, along
with their attendant feelings and constructively ori-
ented responses. Such sequences are social: partic-
ipants enact abduction sequences jointly. Such
sequences are also creative: participants discover
new understanding of puzzling situations, attribute
newmeaning to them, imaginenewpossibilities, and
try on and negotiate what those future possibilities
might look like in practice.
Abduction Sequence #1—engage the indetermi-
nate situation—involves an initial confrontationwith
a surprising situation that interrupts ongoing activ-
ity, and participants’ subsequent efforts to under-
stand that situation. Through social creative activity,
such as walking care flows with patients, partici-
pants discover what they had not known or antici-
pated about the situation that, in turn, prompts
reconsideration of prior habits. This initial sequence
is critical to the discovery process in two respects.
First, the surprise is participants’ first realization that
something may be awry: not yet actionable, given
prevailing habits, the situation becomes indetermi-
nate. Second, the discovery process is fragile: partic-
ipants’ efforts can readily, and almost imperceptibly,
eitherenablediscovery (e.g., thepresent study;Dunne
& Dougherty, 2016) or derail it (Chai, 2017) at this
nascent juncture.
Abduction Sequence #2—deepen the significance
of the indeterminate situation—is prompted by rec-
ognition of new or expanded difficulties; for exam-
ple, “How can we not know how our patients get
out?” Specifically, this sequence offers an important
opportunity for participants to broaden the purpose
and scope of change by imbuing the indeterminate
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situation with deepened significance. Rather than
perpetuating a predetermined or provisional pur-
pose for a change initiative, participants continue to
explore what they still do not know about the inde-
terminate situation. When successful, they make
new meaning, transforming the situation from a mat-
ter of fact (e.g., removing systemic obstacles to care) to
a matter of essential concern (Latour, 2004), such as
helping patients get well (Lorino, 2018).
Abduction Sequence #3—construct an imagined
configuration—shifts participants’ attention toward
imagining possible ways to reconstruct the indeter-
minate situation as they have come to understand it.
More specifically, they imagine a “configuration of
interactions,” such as Collaborative Care, that en-
ables them to “capture enough of the vast but noisy
information” (Dunne & Dougherty, 2016: 143) while
continuing to pursue the unfolding discovery pro-
cess. An imagined configuration is tentatively con-
sidered, and may not ultimately be used, but it is
critical in mediating participants’ transition from
prevailing habits toward future ones.
In Abduction Sequence #4—try on new habits—
participants experiment with potential new habits
associated with the imagined configuration; they are
likely to experience both discomfort and comfort
with proposed new features (e.g., Trio). Depending
on the results, they can begin to enact new habits or
holdontoprevailingones.Tryingonnewhabitseither
provides further assurance (reinforcing new belief)
that the imagined configurationwillwork in practice,
or amplifies doubt (reinforcing prevailing belief) about
the proposed model and its components.
Abduction Sequence #5—negotiate new habits—
involves negotiating the terms and potentially even
the continued existence of new habits associated
with the new configuration. At this juncture, as
compared to Sequence 4, some participants cling to
prevailing habits more tightly, expressing serious
reservations about proposed new habits. It can take
an impasse—a standstill in ongoing activity—to ne-
gotiate the terms for integrating new habits. It is
central to successful negotiations that participants
jointly explore tensions between new and prevailing
habits, not for purposes of dismissal or adaptation of
one to the other, but to imagine creatively a third
option that reorients prevailing habits and enables
new ones. In this respect, Abduction Sequence #5
fosters further meaning-making, even after imple-
mentation, about what the new model and its con-
stituent elements signify.
Constructively oriented responses. The study
found that constructive responses to surprising
situations, such as listening to and actively consid-
ering negative patient input, can sustain further dis-
coveries within and across abduction sequences.
The literature on organizational surprise conceives
surprise either as an exogenously generated threat to
be neutralized or minimized (Cunha et al., 2006;
McDaniel, Jordan, & Fleeman, 2003) or as an inherent
feature of complex systems (Bechky & Okhuysen,
2011; Cunha et al., 2006; Reis Louis, 1980) that “can-
not be avoided, eliminated, or controlled” (McDaniel
et al., 2003: 266) and thus requires adaptation. Both
responses discourage discovery; neither halts ongo-
ing activity to explore what is unknown about the
unexpected experience. This kind of response is
conservative, in that it “harmonizes the existing; it
does not create” (Follett, 1924: 228).
By contrast, the present study illuminated a qual-
itatively different response to surprise occurring
within sequences: a constructively oriented one that
suspends ongoing activity to actively engage with
surprise. For participants, not knowingwhat to think
or how to proceed causes discomfort or even agita-
tion. But, rather than trying to control or adapt to
surprise, participants step outside the indeterminate
situation via a discovery process that prompts re-
consideration of prevailing habits. Thus, construc-
tively oriented responses entail “fashioning a reply
instead of merely taking adaptive actions” (Henri
Bergson, cited in McKay & Chia, 2013: 210).
This study showed that, by making narrative con-
nections across individual abduction sequences, par-
ticipants shape discoveries yielded by prior sequences
to make new meaning about the indeterminate situa-
tion that can richly informefforts to reconstruct it, such
as broadened purpose of change via connecting Se-
quences#1and#2,andenablehabit reorientation.This
form of responsiveness is especially significant be-
cause it enables a cumulative and thusmore concerted
shift away from prevailing habits toward new ones.
A key implication is that habits themselves do not
derail discovery. What derails discovery is the stub-
bornness or rigidity with which individuals cling to
habits of belief and action (Peirce et al., 1992). It thus
matters how participants respond to surprise: their
response can ignite discovery and potential re-
orientation of prevailing habits, or not.
Abduction Sequences as Analytic Means for
Examining Discovery
This paperproposes abduction—and, inparticular,
abduction sequences—as a means of examining how
discovery operates in organizational change processes.
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By putting discovery under a microscope, abduction
sequences make visible the kind of everyday creativity
within change that can reorient prevailing habits.
By examining shared enactment of abduction se-
quences, this study joins a growing number of em-
pirical, process-based studies of organizational and
strategic change that incorporate micro-analyses of
collective effort. This work draws attention to trans-
action (Dewey & Bentley, 1949), a relational unit of
analysis that conceives humans acting together with
the environment. This analytic perspective is sig-
naled by phrases such as “collectively held experi-
ence” (Balogun et al., 2015) and “joint accounts”
(Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2017).
Abduction sequences are also analytically useful
for identifying and explicating how particular change
mechanisms discussed in the literature, such as will-
ingness to challenge (Wiedner et al., 2017), meaning-
making (Spee& Jarzabkowski, 2017), and sensemaking
(Balogun et al., 2015; Jay, 2013), differ from discovery,
and how they themselves operate to generate or derail
discovery. Bringing an analytic eye for discovery into
data collectionandanalysiswill helpusbetter theorize
how and why particular change mechanisms, and
particularwaysof enacting them, foster (or subvert) the
reorienting of habits within change.
Finally, attention todiscoveryandabductionenables
richer theorizing about breakdowns (Jarzabkowski
et al., 2019), paradoxes (Jay, 2013), and other “trig-
gers” of creative action. As discovery unfolds, break-
downs of prevailing habits become starting points for
reorienting habits. By conceiving of such prompts
analytically as surprising experience, research could
examine such components of discovery as how and
which expectations are breached, and how particular
types of surprise might catalyze expansive inquiry
processes. Thus, breakdowns and other surprises
trigger potential abduction sequences that, condi-
tioned on participants’ constructively oriented re-
sponse, can stymie prevailing habits, halt ongoing
activity, engagewhat is not known, and, by enabling
expansive inquiry, bring about discovery.
Boundary Conditions and Future Research
This study investigated a system-level change
initiative in a medium-sized health system. Certain
features of the organization and its environment
might explain why members were able to create a
successful new model of care in an industry known
for strong professional boundaries and clinical pro-
tocol that constrain change. At the time of the study,
the health system did not face immediate survival
issues. Thus, it may have been easier to encourage
discovery with a longer-term horizon than it would
be in the face of crises requiring immediate action.
Yet, participants have successfully generated dis-
covery in time-urgent radical change (Jarzabkowski
et al., 2019). Future research might investigate dis-
covery in time-pressured environments. Second,
DeltaCare valued its small but highly credible OD
department that had worked extensively with the
senior leadership team. This suggests that leaders’
involvement per se may not explain an initiative’s
success. Future research could examine the involve-
mentof leadersdisposed toact habitually inways that
foster (not derail) discovery. Finally, senior lead-
ership had recently introduced leanmanagement, a
methodology for promoting transparency and re-
sponsiveness in addressing issues. This methodol-
ogy may have helped mitigate industry norms in
this instance because it was used in the service of
discovery; some examples indicate that lean man-
agement and other prescriptive methods do not al-
ways support system change. Future research could
examine the effect of intentionally incorporating
discovery into these methods.
More generally, this study illuminated discovery
as abductivemechanism for reorienting habits within
change. Future research could analyze how political
and cultural dynamics foster or derail discovery
processes within change. Moreover, at its heart, dis-
covery is a shared, creativity activity, infused with
feelingsofdiscomfort, enthusiasm,passion, irritation,
and joy throughout theprocess. Future researchcould
enrich our understanding of emotions in discovery
processes by elaborating the expression and experi-
ence of these and other emotions in surprise, doubt,
and inquiry, and by examining in turn how these
emotions shape discovery processes and the reor-
ienting of habits.
The literature on change—focused as it is on over-
coming obstacles to organizational change, often in
the form of employee resistance—has overlooked
how participants actually go about the process of
reorienting practice and belief within change. By
adopting a pragmatist conception of reorientation of
habits as a form of creative achievement, this study
has shed light on the undertheorized relation be-
tweendiscoveryand reorientinghabitswithinchange.
It directs scholarly attention toward understanding
participants’ creative engagement with diffusely prob-
lematic situations as critical to generating fundamen-
tally new ways to address them. It also suggests that
both researchandpracticewouldbenefit byassuminga
broader view of abduction and discovery as processes
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that occur continuously within change and other in-
quiry processes.
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